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Abstract 
Pawnbroking, one of the oldest and most accessible forms of credit, was a common feature of 
life in pre-famine and famine Ireland. This paper studies the role of pawnbroking in the Irish 
financial system during this important period, applying insights from modern studies on fringe 
banking to analyse pawnbroking in Ireland. In the period under study, a formal tiered 
financial system existed; regulated joint stock banks offered services to industry and the better 
off, while fringe banks provided financial services largely, but not exclusively, to unbanked 
groups. The main findings are that pawnbrokers provided a steady source of credit throughout 
the island of Ireland and that this credit stream was more durable than that provided by 
alternative financial service providers in the fringe banking market, especially during the 
famine. Our findings suggest a nuanced interpretation is needed as we find strong 
interrelationships between the various financial service providers.    
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Introduction 
‘Fringe’ banking (pawnbrokers, cheque cashing operators and pay-day lenders), an established, 
growing,1  and competitive 2  provider of financial services to a wide swathe of society, has boomed 
in the last three decades (Caskey and Zikmund 1990; Caskey, 1994, 2005; Brooks 2006; Rivlin 
2010; Prager 2014, Rowlingson, Appleyard and Gardner 2016; McMahon 2018). Yet it is derided 
by its mainstream competitors (Kubrin et al. 2011) and the providers are accused of charging 
‘extortionate’ interest rates. Empirical studies have attempted to explain determinants of fringe 
banking and their effects on various individual and social outcomes; the jury is still out on whether 
fringe banking is bane or benefit. 3  Using Ireland as a case study, this paper offers an historical 
perspective to the literature on ‘fringe banking’ and identifies the persistent importance of one 
type of fringe bank – pawnbrokers – as a source of credit and liquidity to the unbanked as well as 
to the cash-strapped, but asset-rich, middle classes.  
As one of the most accessible forms of credit on the British Isles, pawnbroking was 
exceptionally common in nineteenth-century Britain and Ireland.  The role of the pawnbroker, 
traditionally referred to as the ‘people’s banker’ or ‘poor man’s bank’ (although used by the middle 
classes and wealthy as well) was to provide liquidity to households (Fitzpatrick 2001, p. 55; Tebbutt 
1983, p. 22).  Many contemporary social commentators and modern scholars, perhaps viewing 
pawnbroking more from a moral rather than a strictly economic perspective, have portrayed 
pawnbrokers negatively. For example,  Daniel O’Flinn, parish priest of Aghada,  stated , ‘I believe 
them a great nuisance and temptation to the poor in general, for they cannot always release what 
they have pawned’ (BPP 1836, Supplement to appendix E, p. 193). Meanwhile, Clear (2007, pp 
31-32) notes that, ‘pawning meant that those with the least money paid over and over again for 
their meagre goods’.4 Notable contemporaries, however, saw things differently. The Marshal of 
Dublin, whose office acted as the registrar of pawnbrokers in Ireland, asserted that, ‘it is a well 
known fact that the more prosperous a city or town is, the more prosperous it is for the 
 
1 In the US the number of pawnbrokers more than doubled from 4,849 in 1986 to 11,683 in 2003, peaking at 
12,356 in 2001 (Caskey 2005). As of 2018 there are approximately 10,000 shops in the US catering to 7.4 per 
cent of all US households: National Pawnbrokers Association FAQ 2018: 
https://nationalpawnbrokers.org/pawn-industry-faqs/ 
2 Pawnshops now offer innovative services including online pawning: https://blog.pawnguru.com/  
3 Consumer protection agencies see payday loan terms, often more than 350 per cent annually, as extortionate 
(Ellihausen and Lawrence 2001, Stegman 2007) and the marketing practices of payday lenders as predatory 
(Ellihausen 2009), leading to reductions in borrower well-being (Melzer 2011).  Other studies show that these 
loans can impose a smaller burden than paying late fees, re-establishing a utility, or paying a bank overdraft fee, 
thereby improving lives (Morse 2007, Morgan 2007, Morgan and Strain 2008), and can be offered by traditional 
financial institutions, removing detrimental features and promoting saving, to the benefit of both borrower and 
lender (Stegman 2007).  
4 Clear cites Fitzpatrick’s (2001) narrative account of pawnbroking. 
3 
 
pawnbroking trade, and consequently it is so with a nation.’ (Reports of the Corporation of Dublin 
1886, p. 40).5 
This paper examines whether pawnbroking is better described historically as the last desperate 
option of the truly poor, as often portrayed by nineteenth century social reformers such as Smiles 
(2002 [1856]), or a valued and legitimate financial service for a wide swathe of the population. 
Moving beyond anecdotal accounts, this study outlines the geographic distribution and 
determinants of pawnbroking in early nineteenth century Ireland.  We use a cross-section of 
pawnbrokers in the year immediately prior to the famine, relying on a newly compiled, manually 
collected and collated data set of all available pawnbroker information for the period 1838-1848.  
These data are from published parliamentary papers and other contemporaneous sources.  Like 
many modern studies, it is difficult to observe pawnbroking loan use directly (Bhutta 2014), but 
by collating sources this study finds evidence of ubiquitous pawnbroking activity.  Because 
pawnbroking is only one of many ‘fringe banking’ institutions, this study also explores its 
relationship with other microfinance institutions, in particular microsavings and microcredit.6 For 
the Irish of minimal means, the so-called industrious poor, there were two primary sources of 
formal credit – pawnbrokers and Loan Funds, either Loan Fund Societies or Reproductive Loan 
Funds – and one saving institution, Trustee Saving Banks (McLaughlin & Pecchenino 2021). 
The paper proceeds from here by giving an overview of the empirical literature on fringe 
banking followed by an outline of the legal environment. The subsequent sections explore the 
supply- and demand-side of pawnbroking in pre-famine and famine Ireland.  
Fringe banking and pawnbroking 
‘Fringe banking’ is a term associated with alternative providers of financial services relative to 
retail banks. It encompasses a wide array of service providers including payday lenders, check 
cashers, pawnbrokers, rent-to-own stores, and subprime mortgages, as well as a combination of 
the above (Caskey 1994, Graves 2003).  In all cases these providers of credit charge more for their 
services than retail banks while providing credit, often without credit checks, when retail banks 
will not.  The focus of this section is on pawnbroking, the original fringe banking institution, as 
other providers did not exist in nineteenth century Ireland.7 
Today, pawnbrokers are still a major source of credit throughout the world (Bouman and 
Houtman 1988; Lamberte 1988; Skully 1994; Ismail and Ahmad 1997; World Bank 2013).  They 
 
5 Pawnbrokers were often held in high esteem as recognized providers of economic and social good in 18th 
century England (Tomkins 2003). 
6 The unbanked are more likely to use fringe banking services (Fox and Woodhall 2006 ; Visano 2008).  
7 Many studies cited below discuss ‘payday loans’ which include pawnbrokers who provide both services. See 
Stegman (2007) for an overview of the payday lending literature. 
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help reduce transaction costs, because pawnbrokers are not interested in the use of the funds 
proffered, and overcome the asymmetric information problems that plague financial 
intermediation by providing fully-collateralized credit. Pawnbrokers make loans based on the 
appraised value of a pledge, the collateral, giving the borrower a percentage of this valuation. When 
a loan is repaid with interest, the borrower redeems their pledge. If the borrower defaults, the 
lender assumes ownership of the pledge then sells it to recoup costs and make a profit.  
Caskey(1994, p. 112), in a study of US pawnbroking in the 1980s, suggests four reasons for 
the high cost of borrowing, as indicated in table A1 for 19th century Ireland and Britain: first,  all 
collateral is individually assessed and stored locally; second, scale economies are unrealised because 
customers patronize local brokers; third, borrower transportation costs create local monopolies; 
and fourth,  collateral storage on site generates high security costs. This leads to ‘geographic areas 
[that] are generally served by numerous, dispersed [monopolistically competitive] fringe banks, 
which operate at less than their most efficient scale’ (Caskey 1994, p.114).  Minkes’s (1953) findings 
for British pawnbroking generally agree with those of Caskey, noting in addition that, where the 
interest rate chargeable is constrained by statute, competition could manifest itself in the 
proportion lent on the value of the pledges. 
As national data on fringe banking is not readily available (Stegman 2007), the empirical 
literature has divided into two strands: one estimates the spatial determinants of fringe banking 
and a second estimates the impact of fringe banking on economic and social outcomes. Both 
branches use cross-sectional spatial data to address empirical questions.  Some studies focusing on 
social and economic impacts have access to time-series data from specific lenders.   
The spatial determinants of fringe banking consider several hypotheses:  the retreat/availability 
of commercial banks and thrifts (spatial void), educational levels, poverty rates, population density, 
presence of minorities, and differences in inter-state regulatory environments. Studies range in unit 
of spatial analysis from state to county (Caskey 1991, 1994; Shackman and Tenney 2006, Fowler 
et al 2014, Prager 2009, 2014, Gallmeyer & Roberts 2009, Cover et al 2014, Graves 2003; Smith et 
al. 2008, Faber 2018). Most studies are cross-sectional, and findings vary according to the data and 
methodology adopted. While studies using similar data tend to agree on key factors, demographic 
(ethnicity, poverty, education) correlates and influence of regulation (more stringent regulation 
reduces the number of fringe banks), there are differences in terms of the relationship with the 
wider financial system. For example, Prager (2014), analysing fringe banks per million at county-
level data, finds that banks are correlated positively with pawnshops in urban areas and negatively 
with fringe banks in rural areas. While Fowler et al. (2014), analysing the number of pawnshops by 
county (using count models), find banks and pawnshops are uncorrelated.  
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 Despite several high-profile studies, the literature on outcomes associated with fringe banking 
remains inconclusive as to whether ‘fringe banking’ is a beneficial source of short-term credit or a 
high interest option that entraps borrowers in a cycle of debt (e.g. Bhutta et al. 2015, Morgan et al. 
2012, Zinman 2010 versus Melzer 2011, Carrell and Zinman 2014).  A related strand of literature 
focuses on the relationship between fringe banking, specifically pawnbroking, and crime (Fass and 
Francis 2004, Lee et al. 2014, Kurbin et al. 2011, Wilcox & Eck 2011)).  The results are varied and 
inconclusive.  
Pawning in Ireland: institutional context and data constraints 
In contrast to continental Europe, pawnbroking was a privately-operated trade in Ireland. Scant 
archival material survives relating to pawnbroker activities. Instead, the main sources for analysing 
nineteenth century pawnbroking are a series of social reform-motivated parliamentary enquiries 
(BPP 1835, 1836, 1837-38, 1867-68) and government publications (e.g. BPP 1849). Laws enacted 
in the 1780s regulated pawnbroking in Ireland for over 180 years, with the specific Irish laws 
continuing to be enforced in Ireland after the Act of Union in 1801.8 In 1843 a bill to reform Irish 
pawnbroking was proposed (BPP 1843b), but did not progress beyond committee stage.9 
Extensive lobbying by the Pawnbrokers Association (established in 1836) ensured it was 
unsuccessful (Hardaker 1892, pp 62, 73-4; BPP 1867-68, p.2). Following parliamentary enquiries 
in the 1860s, pawnbroking laws were reformed in Great Britain, but these reforms did ‘not extend 
to Ireland’ (35 & 36 Vict., section 2; Hancock 1876). 10   
In this paper we manually collected and collated available pawnbroker information for the 
period 1838-1848 from published parliamentary papers. These data provide information on the 
location of pawnbrokers, the aggregate amount of credit provided, the number of loans (tickets), 
and, in a small sample, the redemptions of pledges. Before discussing these data in detail, we 
contextualise the institutional structure and explain why these data have been underutilised in 
existing studies.  
The Irish pawnbroking acts stated that the Marshal of Dublin was the register of pawnbrokers 
in Ireland and an auctioneer of forfeited pledges in the city of Dublin. The office of the Marshal 
of Dublin was established in the third year of the reign of James II [1688]. The initial functions of 
the office were: ‘Governor of the City Marshalsea, for confinement of debtors under warrants 
from Courts under control of the Corporation; storage of goods seized under City attachments; 
 
8 Irish Parliament, 26 Geo. 3 & 28 Geo. 3; Irish Republic, 31/1964. 
9 Raymond’s (1978, pp 19-20) thesis is based on the mistaken belief that the 1843 bill reforming Irish pawnbroking 
was enacted.    
10 From the outset there was no reference to Ireland in any of the pawnbroking bills: BPP (1870b, 1872b, 1872c).   
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and attendance on the Lord Mayor on state occasions’ (Reports of the Corporation of Dublin 
1886, pp 20-21). These functions became obsolete, and the position evolved into a more 
ceremonial role, although with the requirement of regulating the pawnbroking trade throughout 
Ireland.  
Pawnbrokers were required to submit monthly returns to the Marshal of Dublin, who was 
required to submit an annual abstract to parliament. The legislation stipulated that pawnbrokers 
who did not submit returns would be fined 40 shillings (£2). The requirement of submitting returns 
was not enforced but, instead of issuing fines for non-compliance, an annual sum of £1 was 
requested from pawnbrokers by the Marshal in lieu of their returns (BPP 1835, pp 36-37; BPP 
1837-38, Qs 886-887; Reports of the Corporation of Dublin 1886, p. 36).11 This custom was alleged to 
have continued throughout the nineteenth century giving the Marshal ‘a sinecure income of 
considerable amount by compromising an important duty of the office’ (Reports of the Corporation of 
Dublin 1886, p. 23). The issue was compounded by the position of the Marshal being temporary, 
elected at the behest of Dublin Corporation, and unsalaried and dependent on fees ‘legally payable 
to him by virtue of his office’.12 Thus, when in 1886 the then Marshal, John S. Carroll, attempted 
to enforce compliance from pawnbrokers, his requests were ignored. He stated that, ‘my only 
remedy would be to go through the country and sue each individual. This would involve an 
enormous expenditure, and which my present position would hardly justify’ (Reports of the 
Corporation of Dublin 1886b). 
Given the sporadic undertaking of duty by various Marshals, surviving pawnbroker data is 
quite scarce and patchy. Pre-1837 pawnbroker data was under-reported. From 1837, after Marshal 
John Judkin Butler visited towns and their pawnbrokers (BPP 1837-37, p. 163), a clearer picture 
of pawnbroking becomes available. Butler’s successor, Thomas Reynolds, provided returns for the 
years 1844-1848, during the crucial years of the Irish famine. Successors to the office in the 1850s 
and 60s also provided returns.13 These isolated sources provide a sense of the number of 
pawnbrokers, around 450-500, equating to c. 55-60 per million capita, and the scale of their 
activities, pawnbroker loans were in the region of £1-£2 million per annum, see Table 1. These 
data cover key years during the famine highlighting the 14 per cent year-on-year increase in 
pawnbroker lending in 1845, lending that was sustained in 1847, only retreating in 1848. The scale 
of pre-famine pawnbroking activity was similar to other contemporary microfinance institutions 
but, unlike pawnbrokers, LFSs and TSBs experienced significant declines in activity in the famine 
 
11 Unashamedly, one of the Marshals in the early 1830s was alleged to have issued receipts to pawnbrokers who 
paid the £1 requested in lieu of their returns (BPP 1835, p.37). 
12 Dublin City Council/History, City Marshal, R1/01/03, Dublin City Archive. 
13 E.g. OP 1865/123, OP 1868/22, OP 1868/23, OP 1870/40, OP 1870/42, National Archives of Ireland.  
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years. This comparison highlights the significance of pawnbrokers as a stable source of credit to 
the poor during the famine years.14 
The traditional practice of pawnbrokers is to make primarily short-term loans based on the 
appraised value of an item giving the borrower a percentage of this valuation.15 LFS loans were 
similar but unsecured, with 20-week terms and weekly repayments. In Ireland pawnbroker loan 
terms depended on the value of the durable pledge (the size of the initial loan), ranging from 6 to 
12 months (BPP 1867-68, p. 27). For example, loans were issued up to 80 per cent of the estimated 
value of durable goods (plate and jewellery), and in the region of 66 per cent or less for non-
durable goods (clothes). According to Edward Homan, a Limerick pawnbroker in the 1830s, loan 
valuations were based on what a pawnbroker would ‘get on them after 12 months’ (BPP 1837-38, 
Qs 936-938), taking storage and depreciation costs into account. Interest charges, displayed in 
Table A1, varied according to the sum lent (BPP 1837-38, p. iv). For loans under £10, pawnbrokers 
were exempt from usury laws. While Irish rates were higher than those permitted in Britain for 
most of the period (Ó Gráda 1974, p. 132), British rates were increased after the 1872 Pawnbroker 
Act.16 In contrast to pawnbrokers, the legislation imposed ceiling on LFSs discount rates were 
much lower, initially at 12 per cent and reduced to 8.25 per cent in 1843 (see McLaughlin & 
Pecchenino 2021, Table 2). 
The scope of pawnbroker lending was legally constrained by an easily evaded (BPP 1837-38, 
p. xv) £10 loan ceiling (28 Geo III, section 19). Above £10 usury laws applied. The market for 
loans greater than £10 was very competitive with moneylenders, private banks and, from the mid-
1820s onwards, joint stock banks (JSBs). Such competition limited pawnbrokers’ potential 
profitability for this class of loans. Yet, in terms of competing with rival microcredit providers 
(LFSs), also bound by a £10 ceiling , pawnbrokers’ ability to operate above the ceiling was crucial 
to maintaining business operations. 
 
14 A strand of LFSs called Reproductive Loan Funds operated in the provinces of Munster and Connaught. They 
were completely wound up in 1848: Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Society Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict.), c. 115. 
15 The pawnbroking business in Victorian Ireland worked as follows.  An individual would bring an, or several, 
item(s) to a pawnbroker.  The pawnbroker would assess the pledge(s), accepting those with estimated resale 
value greater than inventorying and other transaction costs.  The pawnbroker offered the pledger a loan based on 
the value of the pledge(s). If accepted, the information concerning each pledge would be entered into the 
pawnbroker's daybook. A duplicate ticket, provided to the pledger for a penny, described the pledge, provided 
an inventory number, the amount lent, the interest charged (based on the schedule in Table A1), the date at or 
before which the pledge could be redeemed, and the date at which the pawnbroker could bring the item to sale. 
More could be charged on pledges of greater value.  When the pledged item(s) were redeemed, the pawnbroker's 
daybook would show redemption date and the interest paid.  Pledges not redeemed would be sold, with the date 
of sale chosen to maximize value. This information would be recorded in the pawnbroker's daybook. 
16 Pawnbrokers Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict.), c. 93. 
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Defaulted pledges were sold at public auction with notice of the auction given to the pledge 
owners (BPP 1867-68, p. 30),17 although defaulting borrowers rarely attended (BPP 1837-38, Q. 
956; BPP 1867-68, p. 30). The main buyers were dealers in second-hand goods (BPP 1837-38, Qs 
340-341; BPP 1867-68, pp 29-30). Private sale was also used to dispose of unredeemed stock (BPP 
1849, p.150). Redemption and re-sale were important components of the cyclically sensitive 
pawnbroking trade.  
There were no major barriers to becoming a pawnbroker in nineteenth-century Ireland. All 
one needed was to purchase a licence and provide two sureties (bondsmen), acquire premises and 
make loans.18 There were no minimum capital requirements as pawnbrokers were self-capitalised 
and did not accept deposits. Legal restrictions were imposed to ensure only people of ‘honest 
repute’ obtained licences (BPP 1837-38, p. xii). Part of the motivation for this requirement of 
upstandingness was the potential association between pawnbrokers and crime, a worry that persists 
today, since pawnbrokers could launder the proceeds of petty criminal activity. Pawnbrokers found 
guilty of dealing in stolen goods could be deprived of their licence, prohibited from trading and 
subject to police search if a search warrant was acquired. 19 Available evidence suggests the fear of 
losing a licence was sufficient deterrent. 
The major distinction between pawnbroking in the British Isles and in Continental Europe 
was the private nature of pawnbroking in the former and public in the latter. Large municipal 
pawnbrokers were found throughout Europe.20 Recent studies have highlighted the significance 
of their operation in European cities where they catered to a wide array of borrowers from the 
poorest to the wealthy (Danierei 1991; Führer 2001; Carbonell-Esteller, 2012;  Pastureau and 
Bertrand 2014; Murhem 2015; Carboni and Massimo 2019; Colvin et al. 2020). In the Americas, 
the European model of municipal pawnbroking was replicated in Mexico City, albeit with a sizeable 
private pawn market that catered to the poorer residents (Francois 2006)21, while the British model 
was implemented in the United States (Woloson 2009). Attempts to introduce private equivalents 
to the Continental municipal institutions in the British Isles were undermined by the extensive 
competition from private pawnbrokers (McLaughlin 2013); however, attempts to replicate 
 
17 The case of Rev Hansborough versus Mr F. Byrne (Pawnbroker, Great Britain St, Dublin), is a good example 
of proceedings: Freemans Journal, 20 December 1851. 
18 Occasional advertisements in newspapers offered established pawnbroker shops for sale, with or without 
existing stock, e.g. Freemans Journal, 22 January 1846; 20 March 1847. 
19 (28 Geo. 3, c. 49 [I], section 5); BPP (1867-68, p. 10). While evidence is scant, the fear that pawnbrokers 
provide a way to dispose of stolen persists today (Fass & Francis 2004). 
20 Persson and Sharp (2015, p. 152-153) contextualise municipal pawnshops within wider debates surrounding 
usury. 
21 The Mexican Monte de Piedad was a municipal institution that catered to middle class residents, made loans 
to private pawnbrokers and governments. It later opened a savings bank to help fund lending operations 
(Francois 2006).  
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charitable pawnshops (loan societies) in the United States, although not municipally supported, 
were relatively more competitive as they adopted price floors, operated primarily in more affluent 
neighbourhoods, and had much greater capital backing (Woloson 2009).22  
It is possible to get an insight into the level of competition in Irish pawnbroking from the 
registration dates in pawnbroker returns. In 1844, 45 per cent of pawnbrokers were new entrants, 
registered between 1840 and 1844 and new firms made 35 per cent of loans (see Figure A1). 23  A 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of activity of the 467 pawnbrokers in 1844 reveals that tickets 
had a HHI score of 0.43 per cent and the score for lending was 0.52 per cent. Based on the names 
of listed pawnbrokers, 14 pawnbrokers had more than one, usually two, premises.24 Taking this 
into account, the reweighted HHIs marginally change to 0.54 per cent and 0.60 per cent.  This 
suggests a highly competitive trade, contrary to Caskey (1994), since a HHI index of zero implies 
perfect competition. While similar data is unavailable for commercial banks, data from LFSs 
reveals similar levels of competition; in 1845 the HHI score for LFS lending was 0.83 per cent, 
only marginally higher than the HHI score for pawnbroking.  
   Pawnbrokers’ practice of lending close to 100 per cent of the value of pledges, rather than 
engaging in price competition, also suggests a highly competitive industry.  This is corroborated 
by contemporary testimony (BPP 1837-38, Qs. 849, 858-861, 1078-1082, 1091). During the famine 
period, some pawnbrokers declared that one of the main causes of decline in their business activity 
was enhanced competition: the entry of rival pawnbrokers in their locality (BPP 1849, p. 151, pp. 
153). 
Published pawnbroker returns provide only summary information on the number and amount 
of loans, making it difficult to generalise about capital levels and profitability. There is, however, a 
detailed return of 22 pawnbrokers from Cork City in 1837 (BPP 1837-38, p. 226). In this sample, 
mean income, including tickets, was 7.85 per cent of loan turnover, which is very similar to the 
finding by Minkes (1953, p. 14) of 7 per cent for British pawnbrokers. The mean profit was 4.24 
per cent of loan turnover, giving a mean return on capital of 14.54 per cent. For comparison, in 
1842 LFSs income to loan ratio averaged 3.62 per cent and profit to loan averaged 1 percent, whilst 
return to capital averaged 3.95 per cent in 1842. 
 
 
22 Investors in the the Provident Loan Society of New York were a who’s who of New York’s commercial elite, 
including J. P. Morgan who invested tens of thousands of dollars in the venture (Woloson 2009, p. 165).   
23 Thirteen pawnbrokers are recorded as having resigned their positions. A further two Dublin-based 
pawnbrokers were recorded as having died (William Parkes, registered in 1825, and Michael McGarry in 1836): 
BPP (1845b).  
24 There were three exceptions. William H. Trenwith ran three pawnshops in Cork, Anne & John Higgins had 
three pawnshops, two in Waterford and one in Cork, and John Slattery had five pawnshops, three in Waterford. 
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The formal microfinance landscape 
Pre-famine pawnbroking is of particular interest in relation to microfinance institutions in 
nineteenth century Ireland. Existing scholarship on pre-famine and famine Ireland has tended to 
focus on specific aspects of microcredit but not their interrelationships. Ó Gráda’s (1999) study 
of moneylenders during the famine discusses pawnbrokers and LFSs, but not the relationship 
between them. Hollis and Sweetman’s (1998, p. 353) study of microcredit in pre-famine Ireland 
focuses on LFSs alone but the authors acknowledge this particular focus ignores the sizeable 
amount of credit provided by pawnbrokers. Recent work by Goodspeed (2016a, 2016b) on LFSs 
in Ireland completely overlooks the relationship between LFSs and pawnbrokers and mistakenly 
conflates pawnbroking and LFSs.25,26 
In contrast to pawnbrokers, LFSs offered cheap loans without the requirement of providing 
pledges (Hollis & Sweetman, 1998; McLaughlin & Pecchenino 2021). LFS loans, generally to small 
holders and hucksters, used various means, including social pressure and weekly instalments, to 
ensure repayment. LFSs were generally open only one or two days per week.  LFSs offered 
relatively low interest loans, 8.25 per cent APR compared to 25-50 per cent APR charged by 
pawnbrokers.  This price differential should have rung the death knell for pawnbroking (e.g., BPP 
1854-55, p. 55). However, although LFS loans were cheap and small from the perspective of the 
better off, they were much larger than the typical loan from a pawnbroker, a traditional provider 
of credit for the industrious poor (Ó Gráda 1974) and required sureties as well as an economic 
rationale for the loan, imposing additional and potentially non-trivial costs on the borrower.27 
Pawnbrokers cared only about the value of the pledge. In fact, the average weekly LFS repayment 
was approximately the same size as the total average loan from pawnbrokers.  
In the peak year of LFS registration, there were 461 (55 LFSs per million capita).28 LFSs were 
predominantly rural institutions; there was only one in Belfast in 1841 and none thereafter, and 
two in Dublin City in 1842.  LFSs were designed as charitable institutions whose profits were 
supposed to be applied to charitable expenditure.  LFS pamphleteers claimed that the LFSs were 
established to provide cheap credit for the ‘industrious poor’ and specifically to curb the influence 
 
25 There is limited evidence to support Goodspeed’s (2016b, p.267) claim that pawnbrokers ‘reconstituted as loan 
funds’. Pawnbrokers were registered as sole traders and very few partnerships existed. LFSs operated as mutual 
societies with depositor-members. Re-registering as a LFSs would imply lower profits, a change in business model 
and organisational structure. 
26 Although the historical focus on formal providers of credit such as LFSs may be due to the wider availability 
of preserved records (Honohan 2006, p. 63), the same information is not as prevalent for informal lenders (e.g., 
the mealmongers, gombeenmen, etc.). 
27 When someone had an urgent need for money or wished to take advantage of lower prices for provisions early 
in the day, pawnbroking was quicker than waiting on the formalities of a LFS (BPP 1837-38, Q. 706). 
28 The 461 figure comes from the 300 LFSs registered with the Loan Fund Board in 1842 and an additional 161 
Reproductive Loan Funds that were affiliated with a London board.  All Reproductive Loan Funds were closed 
simultaneously in 1848. 
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of usurers, such as mealmongers, gombeenmen,29 and pawnbrokers. A number of LFSs also 
operated charitable pawnbrokers, Monts-de-Piété. This practice was not always looked upon 
favourably.30 Overall, contemporary opinion was divided, with some placing LFSs in the same 
bracket as, or worse than, pawnbrokers. 31 Porter (1841, p. 216) notes, however, that one of the 
benefits of the LFS systems was the formalisation of informal credit; deposits in LFSs were derived 
from former ‘usurious’ lenders who found LFSs attractive as they both provided higher returns 
and ‘saves them all risk and trouble attendant on lending’.32 
The availability of credit from pawnbrokers enabled some LFS borrowers to repay their LFS 
loans and thus to borrow at all.  Evidence to the Devon Commission in the mid-1840s alleged that 
struggling LFS borrowers were obliged to pawn assets to repay loans (BPP 1845, witnesses 431, 
538, 983, Q. 30, 27, 22), because their income flow was lumpy but LFS loan repayment schedules 
were smooth. Those using a pawnbroker’s services were not selling their valuable assets, rather 
they were smoothing their income flow with the intention of reclaiming their goods.  In a 
subsequent inquiry into LFSs in 1855, Rev. Irwin suggested that LFSs replaced some pawnbrokers, 
but he also argued that LFSs stimulated the pawnbroking trade as people who could not make 
loan repayments were ‘forced’ to borrow (BPP 1854-55, Qs 863-871). There is also some anecdotal 
evidence to suggest utilisation of both services. For example Mr Murphy, a tailor in Kinsale, had 
debts at both the local LFSs (£3 5s) and pawnbroker (five £1 loans).33 
Savings Banks, first introduced in the 1810s, were set up exclusively to provide savings services 
to the poor.  By 1841 there were 10 TSBs per million capita. A key distinction between savings 
banks found in Ireland (and Great Britain) and contemporary savings banks found in Europe and 
the US was that savings banks in Ireland did not provide credit services, so did not fund local 
investment.  Further, they had annual (£30) and total (£150) deposit ceilings per account over the 
period of this study.  TSBs offered high return but illiquid deposits; they required notice of 
withdrawal, with this process taking at least a week (Johnson 1985, p. 114).  Savers balanced their 
immediate but uncertain need for liquidity with their need for long-term saving. Liquidity was 
ensured by holding real assets. As Washington (2006) notes, the unbanked traditionally saved in 
easily pawnable goods (jewellery or gold). Since pawnbrokers were open every day they could 
 
29 See Gibbon and Higgins (1974), Kennedy (1977), and Higgins (1985) for debates surrounding the  facts and 
fiction of “gombeenman” in Irish economic history. Although here the discussion is centred primarily on the 
post-famine period, particularly 20th century experience.  
30 E.g. see The Nation, 14 December 1844. 
31 See Nenagh Guardian, 18 February 1843. 
32 Higgins shows how there are different uses and origins of the word “gombeen” and that it has come to mean  
either ‘usurer’ or ‘mealmonger’, and that the earliest use of the term dates to 1862 in Coulter’s The West of 
Ireland in 1862. In the quote above Porter deliberately uses the word ‘usurer’ rather than gombeen, but infers 
the same meaning as gombeen. See Higgins (1985) for discussion of the etymology of the word gombeen. 
33 Freemans Journal, 21 February 1848. 
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quickly realise the value of tangible savings (Johnson 1985).  Long-term financial security was 
ensured by holding saving deposits.  
Pawnbroking developments are relevant in relation to developments in retail banking in the 
nineteenth century. Ireland possessed JSBs that performed saving and loan functions across their 
branch network. From 1783 to 1820 the Bank of Ireland was the only joint-stock bank on the 
island. It operated on a unit bank principle with no branches despite pleas from merchants in 
Belfast and Cork (Hall 1946, p. 172). Outside Dublin, small private banks were the norm. The 
1819-20 Irish financial crisis saw the closure of many private banks, particularly in Munster (Kenny 
& Turner 2019).  It was not until the legal impediments to the formation of JSBs were removed in 
1825 that branch banking institutions could again provide banking services (see Barrow 1973).  
Until they did, effectively after the famine, pawnbrokers, however imperfectly, provided needed 
financial services locally.   
Following the approaches of Caskey (1994), Prager (2014), and Fowler et al. (2014), it is 
possible to formally assess what factors influenced pawnbroking in relation to other financial 
institutions in the pre-famine period using information from Marshal of Dublin reports (BPP 1849, 
pp 154-157).34 A cross-section of pawnbroker data is analysed for the year 1844,35 the year 
preceding the famine, when there were 463 pawnbroking offices recorded making loans worth 
£1.6m on 11.81 million pledges. This data is arranged by electoral division, it is georeferenced and 
matched with corresponding baronial divisions (using qGIS software),36 a level of administrative 
aggregation used for collecting census returns.  
The number of pawnbrokers registered dwarfs the number of LFS at their peak (300), although 
the number is roughly equal when Reproductive Loan Funds that operated in Munster and 
Connaught are accounted for. The mean number of pawnbrokers was 1.44 per barony, a value 
skewed by the high concentration of pawnbrokers in Belfast and Dublin.  Excluding these cities, 
the mean per barony was 1.19. Lending was considerable, totally £1.6 million, excluding Belfast 
and Dublin this total is significantly lower at £0.9 million, but still a sizeable source of credit. Loans 
per 100 capita are £12.24 or £11.02 excluding the two cities and the mean loan size is £0.05 (1 
shilling). The largest mean loan size is outside the major cities, driven by Munster’s active 
pawnbroking trade (see Table 2).  
 
34 Colvin et al. (2020) use a similar approach to analyse the market entry of cooperative banks in the 
Netherlands in the 1890s, although the distinction there is that pawnbrokers were one of the incumbent 
institutions. 
35 Data from famine years are not used because of the distorting influence of the famine on the pawnbroker as 
well as census variables. 
36 QGIS 3.14 Madeira using the ‘join attributes by location’ application. 
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Prager (2014) and Fowler et al. (2014) use demographic characteristics, such as race, age, 
education, and poverty, from the census to study the determinants of fringe banking. The census 
of Ireland provides relevant data on socioeconomic factors that may have affected pawnbroking. 
The population at the time of the 1841 census was 8.17 million with pre-famine population density 
averaging 3.42 people per acre. High concentrations of population in small areas may have created 
sufficient demand for multiple pawnbroking establishments. Urban areas with higher population 
may have had a significant proportion of the population excluded from other formal financial 
lenders (Caskey 1991, pp 92-94).   
Although most of the island of Ireland was agrarian in outlook and occupation, an urban 
society slowly emerged over the nineteenth century. The share of non-agricultural occupations 
reflects this growing urbanisation and specialism; the associated diversification in occupations may 
have resulted in credit needs different to traditional agriculturalists and thus a positive association 
with pawnbroking. Furthermore, pawnbrokers may have been a source of short-term credit for 
tradesmen, as was the case in Britain (Tebbutt 1983, p. 23), since tradesmen found it difficult to 
access credit from JSBs (BPP 1884-85, p. 554). While wage data is not reported in the censuses, 
indicators of poverty are. The percentage of families living in fourth class housing, the lowest 
quality housing available (Prunty 1998, p. 41), reflects absolute poverty. Access to education, 
another indicator of poverty, is reflected in illiteracy rates. As illiteracy and fourth-class housing 
are highly correlated, they cannot be included simultaneously in regression analysis.  
In the main analysis the number of pawnbrokers is modelled using count models. Traditional 
Poisson models assume there is an equality of the (conditional) variance and mean (equi-
dispersion). In practice this can be violated when the variance is greater than the mean 
(overdispersion) (Wooldridge 2002).37 As a result of overdispersion, a negative binomial model 
was estimated with the distribution of 𝑦𝑖  (the number of pawnbrokers per barony) given 
𝑥𝑖 (control variables): 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑚(𝑥𝑖𝛽)                                                            (1) 
The negative binomial model treats dispersion as a parameter that can be estimated. Where the 
conditional variance of 𝑦𝑖  given 𝑥𝑖  is a quadratic of the conditional mean, there is overdispersion. 
A similar format can be used to analyse the amount of loans and average loans. Here the 
specification is a linear regression using OLS.  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                       (2) 
 
37 Tests indicate presence of overdispersion (p = 0.02), a negative binomial regression  (nb2) was chosen to 
analyse the count of LFSs (Cameron & Trivedi 2013). 
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The unit of analysis is a barony and both the negative binomial and the OLS models incorporate 
robust standard errors. Appendices report results for spatial models including spatial lags of both 
𝑦𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖 .  
The relevant control variables are drawn primarily from the 1841 census and the newly enacted 
Poor Law. Additional data on LFSs, TSBs, and JSBs were collected by the authors from 
contemporary sources. The main explanatory variables are poverty (illiteracy), wealth (poor law 
valuation per acre), financial institutions (LFSs, TSBs, and JSBs), and non-agricultural 
employment. As there may be other confounding factors provincial dummies are included for the 
three major provinces: industrial Ulster, commercial Leinster, and food processing Munster 
(Bielenberg 1991; Bielenberg 2009). See Tables A2 and A3 for full description of variables and 
summary statistics. 
Table 3 presents results of negative binomial models as both incidence rate ratios (IRR) and 
marginal effects at means. Results are presented including and excluding Belfast and Dublin.38 The 
striking result is the close relationship with other financial institutions. Holding everything 
constant, a one unit increase in the number of JSBs, TSBs, and LFSs increases the number of 
pawnbrokers by a factor of 1.83, 1.52 and 1.10, respectively, and a one unit increase in non-
agricultural employment increases the number of pawnbrokers by a factor of 1.05. In table  3, 
neither wealth nor poverty are significantly associated with pawnbroking, suggesting that both rich 
and poor availed of a variety of financial services using the provider that best met their needs. 
Lastly, the role of Munster is striking. Relative to the other regions it has a very sizeable IRR and 
marginal effect:  in Munster, all else equal, pawnbrokers were a greater source of funds. These 
results are generally consistent across spatial models reported in the appendix.39 
Results from OLS models are shown in Table 4, again presented with (columns 1 and 3) and 
without (columns 2 and 4) Belfast and Dublin. For aggregate lending per capita, JSBs are positively 
associated with pawn loans. Population density is significantly associated (column 1) but not when 
Belfast and Dublin are excluded (column 2). Again, Munster has a large positive correlation with 
pawnbroker loans per capita. In terms of mean loan sizes (columns 3 and 4), the results mirror 
Table 3. With the various financial institutions and non-agricultural employment positively 
correlated with average loan sizes, Munster diverges significantly from the other provinces.  
The importance of pawnbroking in Munster needs some further elaboration. This may be a 
legacy of the 1819-1820 banking crisis which hit Munster most heavily (Kenny & Turner 2019); 
contemporary news reports emphasised the regional impact of the crisis as well as the immediate 
 
38 Table A4 presents correlation matrices and Tables A5-A7 present stepwise regressions. 
39 See Spatial regression appendices and results in Tables A8 and A9. 
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impact on Cork City itself.40 Contemporaries reported that after the collapse of private banks in 
Munster, bills of exchange substituted for bank notes (BPP 1823, p. 162).41 While merchants had 
provided substantial capital for investment in Cork and wider Munster (Bielenberg 1991, appendix 
1), the banking crisis reduced this source of funds as most private banks were merchant 
partnerships (O’Kelly 1959), and led to a severe regional recession in the early 1820s (Bielenberg 
1991, p. 130). The payments problem was somewhat alleviated by the gradual establishment of 
branches of the newly formed JSBs from 1825 onwards; the Provincial Bank opened a branch in 
Cork City in September 1825 followed by the Bank of Ireland. This was a slow and rocky process; 
aggressive branch expansion of the Agricultural & Commercial Bank between 1834-1836 led to its 
collapse. Commercial banks were initially more reticent to lend to industry than the previous 
private banking regime.  It was only in the post-famine period that the JSBs became a major source 
of credit to industry (Bielenberg 1991, p. 131). Thus, it appears that pawnbrokers substituted for 
traditional banking and payment operations in Munster and continued to do so when joint stock 
banking was in its infancy.  
The main parallel between our findings and modern studies is the complementary relationship 
with other providers of fringe banking and the relationship with conventional banking; particularly 
these findings align with Prager (2014). Studies of modern financial services stress the growth of a 
tiered system with regulated financial services for affluent customers and more expensive and less 
regulated services for the less well off (Fox and Woodall 2006; Faber 2018). In the period under 
study, a tiered system existed with the regulated JSBs offering services to industry and the wealthy, 
but our findings suggest that both those of substantial and minimal means used – and used 
simultaneously – the various financial services of all service providers, regulated or not. We do not 
document a clear association between fringe banking and poverty.  Instead, our findings suggest 
pawning to be a reliable source of credit to non-agricultural sectors. 
Demand side: understanding borrower needs 
Contrary to Clear’s (2007, pp 31-32) contention that pawnbroking represents an activity of the 
poorest, the Marshal of Dublin describes pawnbroking as an indicator of business activity. 
Research on pawnbroking outside Ireland illustrates the complexity of pawnbroking as a 
socioeconomic institution where pawnbroking was used for consumption smoothing and working 
 
40 ‘This city, indeed the entire of the South of Ireland, has sustained a calamity which almost completes the 
climax of its distress, by the failure of one Bank, and the stoppage of another.’: Freeman’s Journal (29 May 
1820). 
41 The continued weaknesses of private banks exacerbated this problem. For example, Daniel Callaghan, 
Director of the Provincial Bank of Cork, stated that in the month (March 1826) preceding the parliamentary 
inquiry on banking in Ireland, Cork had seen the “annihilation” of two private banks one from “failure” and the 
other from the death of a partner (BPP 1826-27, p.41). 
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capital (Hudson 1982; Tebbut 1983; Johnson 1985; Tomkins 2003; Führer 2001; Woloson 2009). 
To improve our understanding of demand for pawnbroking services in Ireland, we analyse 
information from the revealed preferences of borrowers and use insights from contemporaries. 
Looking at mean loan sizes (table 1) relative to wage levels indicates who was pawning.42  Mean 
loan sizes from pawnbrokers in the early 1840s were relatively small, two shillings and sixpence 
(£0.13),43 yet significant in relation to contemporary average weekly wages, about four shillings 
and sixpence (£0.23) in the 1840s and less, around two shillings, for the ‘poor’ (Bowley 1899, p. 
401). From 1836-1848 pawnbroker loans were approximately 50 per cent of the weekly wages of 
general labourers in towns, cities, and the countryside. The data suggest that, contrary to the usual 
perception, pawnbroking was not an activity confined to the poorest.44 Hugh McCall, a Lisburn 
based pawnbroker, suggested that it was ‘the folly of such reasoning’ to assume that pawnbrokers 
only dealt with the poorest wondering ‘how, in the name of all that is absurd, could a Pawnbroker’s 
profits arise from dealing with those who very seldom have any article to pawn’.45 Therefore it is 
reasonable to suggest that pawnbrokers may have been used by a wide variety of people to tide 
them over short term liquidity issues, such as temporary unemployment, or unexpected disasters, 
or to fund investment, or emigration.46 While surviving contemporary pawnbroker accounts are 
hard to find, evidence from advertised auctions of goods, contemporary reports, as well as thefts 
from pawnbrokers show a wide array of pledges from a wide variety of customers. Items included 
gold and silver watches, jewellery including diamond rings, silverware, plate, musical instruments, 
artworks.47 The 1837-38 pawnbroker report indicates that higher value pledges such as these were 
a smaller share of items pledged. The clientele of pawnbrokers from the higher echelons of society 
had a desire for discretion; at times it was reported this meant giving false information about their 
name and addresses on tickets.48 Supportive evidence of such clientele come from cause célèbre 
 
42 See Tables A10 & A11 for samples of wages in Ireland. 
43 This is comparable to an average of $0.62 (£0.13) average pawn loan in New York City in the 1860s (Woloson 
2009, p. 104-105). 
44 The market segmentation in Mexican pawning provides a good illustration. The municipal Monte de Piedad 
had a loan floor of 2 pesos, only accepted higher end silver, and had an average loan of 14 pesos from 1830-1845 
[ c. £3.86]. In contrast private pawnbrokers accepted pawns of lesser value, for example sheets worth ½ reales 
(equivalent to c. 0.06 pesos [c. £0.02]), with average loans reported to be at least ten times lower than the Monte 
de Piedad, with evidence of loans being 4 reales [0.5 pesos, c. £0.13] (Francois 2006, p. 43, p. 137, p. 299). As 
Mexico was on a silver standard, pound values are approximated using a silver exchange rates following Salvucci 
(1994). Also, thanks to Richard Salvucci for explaining the intricacies of Mexican currency and coinage in the 
Republican era. 
45 Belfast Newsletter, 20 March 1838. 
46 Small loans were common features of pawnbrokers everywhere, but as Führer (2001, p. 42) keenly observes, a 
loan that is only half wages would not have been expected to provide relief for a permanent loss of income. 
47 See Kerry Evening Post, 17 June 1848; Cork Examiner, 19 June 1848; Freemans Journal, 12 October 1850 
48 Freemans Journal, 2 May 1846. 
17 
 
that showed (Protestant) clergymen as customers49 and the ‘heaps of patrician plate’ from the 
gentry in the possession of pawnbrokers.50 Dickens even alleged that Irish Members of Parliament 
habitually frequented pawnshops.51  
LFS loans, repayable weekly and to a lesser extent monthly, were significantly larger than 
pawnbroker loans. In the 1840s LFSs loans averaged £3.50 compared with pawnbroker loans of 
£0.13. Pawnbroker loans were in the range of 80 per cent of LFS weekly repayments. In the 1840s 
LFS loans were quite sizeable relative to weekly wages, with weekly repayments approximately 
equal to agricultural and urban wage levels (see table 5). It was argued in the 1850s that LFSs 
provided a stimulus to the pawnbroking trade (BPP 1854-55, p. 55), and the data in table 2 lend 
support to this view as it would have been difficult to repay LFS instalments given prevailing 
wages.  
Contemporary social commentary provides some insight into the demand for pawnbroking 
services. The 1833-36 Poor Inquiry Commission contains references to pawnbrokers, revealing 
both the attitudes of upper classes to the poor and pawnbroking but also some of the motives of 
borrowers.52 The reports from Belfast suggested that availing of pawnbrokers was related to 
‘indulging in drink’, but other evidence suggested that pawnbrokers were used to tide people over 
‘when there is a want of employment or scarcity of food’ or ‘for the purpose of carrying on a trade’ 
(BPP 1836, p. 20). In Cork City it was claimed that there was a relationship between alcohol 
consumption and pawnbroking, but, ‘it was admitted, however, that they [pawnbrokers] are often 
of great service, by enabling persons in distress to raise money on their goods, and thereby 
preventing starvation’ (BPP 1836, p. 26). In Derry there was the accusation that pawning was for 
the ‘purpose of obtaining whiskey’, but there were also ‘those that pledge for the purpose of 
carrying on some trade, and those that pledge from immediate necessity’ (BPP 1836, p.79). 
 In Dublin City it was reported that pawnbroking gave, ‘opportunities to the poor to deprive 
themselves of their little necessaries for sums infinitely below their value’ and that it created a 
temptation to engage in criminal activity because of, ‘the facility which it affords for disposing of 
property improperly obtained’ (BPP 1836, p. 117). Pawnbrokers were associated with alcoholism 
of the poor, but this was based on the opinions of middle-class. The poor themselves did not 
 
49 Examples include a case involving a Church of Ireland clergyman who perjured himself saying he lost a ticket 
for pledged firearms but instead sold it and was attempting to defraud the seller of the ticket.Belfast Newsletter 
15/8/1851; Or the case of a dissenting clergyman who attempted to challenge the pawnbroking acts saying that 
the pawnbroker had acted illegally in selling his gold watch and chain. Freemans Journal 8 August 1851. 
50 Freemans Journal, 23 January 1849. 
51 Dickens, ‘My Uncle’. This observation elicited a response from the Cork Examiner: ‘It should be among the 
pledges required of a candidate of doubtful property qualification, that he shall pledge his honour and his word 
as often as he will – but his watch never’: Cork Examiner, 14 January 1852. 
52 i.e. ‘The feelings of shame which formerly prevented pledging have disappeared, and the practice is now 
resorted to openly and without hesitation.’ (BPP 1836, p. 19). 
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complain about the pawnbroking system, especially since loans were actually close to the full value 
of the item pledged.  It was asserted that, ‘many of the poor habitually on Saturday and Sunday of 
each week expend in the public house a considerable part of their earnings, and to supply the 
pressing wants of their families they have early in the ensuing week to resort to the pawnbroker’s, 
where they deposit their necessary apparel; these articles they again release on Saturday night’ (BPP 
1836, p. 117).  However, their ability to redeem their pledge demonstrates that they were not 
‘drinking’ their loans. The moralistic overtones when discussing pawnbroking clouded discussion 
on pawnbroking.53  
Further information regarding pawning activity is available from BPP (1849), which sought 
reports from pawnbrokers regarding the state of the poor in the country. These reports represent 
an interesting vantage point as they occur during a period of intense crisis in the country. What 
they reveal is that pawnbrokers were used by those who had valuable tangible assets, whether 
clothes, farming implements, or jewellery. Contemporary newspaper reports corroborate these 
views that the pawnbrokers had facilitated the poor in the initial years of the famine. A pawnbroker 
in Bandon reported that loans were £2,500 above usual for the same period of the year but as they 
were ‘crammed to inconvenience’ they rejected pledges owing to a lack of storage.54 Similar stories 
were relayed in other newspapers that pawnbrokers became ‘choked’ and had ‘no more capital to 
advance’55 , that pawnbrokers in Skibbereen, Mallow, and Fermoy were closed against receiving 
any more property at present as pledges,56 and that borrowers had nothing left to pawn.57 Once all 
valuable assets were pledged, profit maximizing pawnbrokers, concerned with their bottom line 
rather than borrower welfare – the professed concern of the charitable LFS –  could provide 
nothing further to would-be borrowers.  
BPP (1849) includes some data on monthly pledges and redemptions for 18 pawnbrokers. The 
distribution of pawnbrokers is disproportionately from famine affected districts in Mayo (2), 
Galway (3), and Kerry (6), but also from districts less affected by famine in Leinster (Wexford, 
Westmeath, and Meath). Here we construct monthly redemption ratios of pledges returned to 
pledges received by 18 pawnbrokers (see Figure 1),58 the data covering almost two years of pre-
 
53 For example, in the parish of Kilbrogan in Cork, the Rev. H. J. Newman opined that pawnbrokers, ‘dealings 
principally carried on with the lowest class, and do much harm - facilitate the working of vice, and cause 
misery’. Maskeylne Alcock, the resident landlord, was more prosaic. He observed that pawnbrokers were, ‘used 
generally by the poor, sometimes by the middle class, according to their necessities’ (BPP 1836, p. 200e).  
54 Nation, 24 November 1846. 
55 Kerry Examiner , 22 December 1846. 
56 Cork Examiner, 11 January 1847. 
57 Freemans Journal, 5 January 1847. 
58 We use current month (Mt) for both pledges returned and pledges received to construct this ratio. An 
alternative is to use pledges returned in M t+1 relative to pledges received in Mt , this has little affect on the 
pattern of the ratio. 
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famine activity as well as the impact of the famine. These figures illustrate that redemptions were 
central to the pawnbroking business model. In most cases there were no noticeable breaks in this 
rate, although an obvious outlier is Ballina in Mayo where the ratio collapsed. A similar finding is 
reported by Ó Gráda (1999) who reported a sample of pledges and redemptions from six 
pawnbrokers (New Ross, Gort, Tipperary, Tralee, Loughrea, and Mullingar). The seasonality of 
pawning supports the view of Joseph Finegan, a pawnbroker from Mullingar, that ‘the numbers 
pledged and redeemed for the first three or four months in every year, are less than the summer 
months, in consequence of the spring work and cheapness of provisions’ (BPP 1849). 
The BPP (1849) correspondence provides information on what assets were pawned; the 
articles were primarily clothes, bedding and furniture (e.g. BPP 1849, p.113). Michael Murray, 
inspector of the Ballinrobe Poor Law Union, believed, ‘that the long existing poverty of the 
population, has of itself precluded the possibility of their realising, or if realised, retaining property 
of a description sufficiently valuable to admit of being taken in deposit’ (BPP 1849, p.132). A 
notable aspect of the data from the 1840s are the seasonality of lending, with pawning greatest in 
the months prior to harvest as, ‘the stock of potatoes is exhausted and labour scarce’. Redemptions 
took place following the harvest as, ‘the labourer can support himself on the potatoes he has 
himself planted, and apply his wages to the redemption of his clothes from the pawn office’ (BPP 
1849, p.113). 
One of the noticeable aspects from these reports is the composition of those pawning before 
and during the famine, with the poorest squeezed from the market as they no longer had assets of 
appraisable value  (BPP 1849, p.119).  Mr Barron, a poor law inspector, noted how ‘a much better 
class of people than formerly are obliged to lodge deposits with the pawnbrokers; and that the 
poorer people’s clothes are often refused, from the fact of their being so bad, and so much worn 
out’ (BPP 1849, p.122). It was reported that the business of pawnbrokers in Carrick-on-Shannon, 
Co. Leitrim, ‘confined to the better classes in society, and to the comparatively comfortable 
farmers, having deemed it expedient to decline accepting of the filthy and valueless rags presented 
for their acceptance by the poorer classes’ (BPP 1849, p. 133). It was reported that ‘the diminution’ 
of pawning in Fermoy, Co. Tipperary, in 1847 and 1848, was ‘caused by the peasantry not having 
any articles to pledge’ (BPP 1849, p. 146). John McCarthy, a pawnbroker in New Ross, Co. 
Wexford, concurred (BPP 1849, p.151). Newspaper reports corroborate this. For example, both 
the Freemans Journal and the Cork Examiner report an increase in pledging of silverware during the 
famine. The Freemans Journal suggested this was a sign of decay (insolvency) in the Irish aristocracy, 
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whereas the Examiner saw it as ratepayers needing greater liquidity.59 Either way, such was the 
reported extent of pawning, the price of wrought silver plate fell by as much as 17 percent. 
Elsewhere, John Hanagan and Edward Kennefick, pawnbrokers from Dungarvan, observed 
that the usual clientele of pawnshops (‘the working population’) were greatly diminished due to 
either death, migration, or entry to the workhouse that the remaining population was   ‘totally 
unable to apply to pawn-offices either to buy, pledge, or redeem; and the remaining part thereof 
are reduced to utter destitution, and are also unable to resort to the pawn-offices in the usual 
manner, which in our opinion, is the cause of the pawnbroking trade being so languid as it is at 
present and very likely to be worse.’ (BPP 1849, p. 110). 
The practice of weekly pledging of clothes was noted by a poor law inspector in Limerick in 
the 1840s, ‘a practice so common a few years ago, is now almost altogether discontinued; not that 
the people are less distressed, but from the fact of not having a second suit’ (BPP 1849, p.112). 
This practice pre-dates the famine as it was observed in 1822 in Limerick that, ‘many persons 
pawned the articles of dress, least necessary, in warm weather, and even their bed clothes to 
procure present subsistence’ (BPP 1823, p. 40). Saturday redemptions was common in Britain too, 
where the working classes pledged their ‘Sunday best’ for the week and redeemed them for Sunday 
(Johnson 1985, pp 165-188).  
Lastly, the BPP (1849) report contains some information on loans and pledges. While Ó Gráda 
(1999) highlights how Dublin experienced a decline in mean loan sizes during the famine, this 
pattern varied across the island.60 Average loan sizes increased in Cork, remained constant in 
Limerick and Belfast, but decreased substantially in Waterford and in other towns. Further data 
on monthly lending are available for a sub-group of 46 pawnbrokers (there are ticket indices for a 
further 22 pawnbrokers, but these do not include loan amounts). We construct monthly indices of 
pawnbroker lending and pledging, where weights are based on pawnbroker share of the sample 
aggregate lending/tickets. Figure 2 highlights the seasonality of these monthly data and indicates 
a slight decrease in pawnbroker activity. The fact that average pawnbroker loans remain relatively 
constant supports a changing clientele as the pledges offered were of a similar value but pledged 
by a different group.61  Figure 3 plots the pawnbroking loan index relative to other available 
monthly economic data on money supply (data from Kenny & Lennard 2019). Here we see a 
similar pattern in activity, which supports findings based on cross-sectional data that pawnbroking 
was a critical component of the financial system.  
 
59 Freemans Journal 23 January 1849; Cork Examiner ,16 April 1849. 
60 Annual data for major towns are highlighted in Figure A2 
61 Figure A3 in appendices show average loans by county. 
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In June 1849 Mr Reynolds, the Marshal of Dublin, noted that the ‘pawnbrokers who had 
previously resided in small country towns in Ireland had almost all disappeared from the country 
towns where they were located’ as they could not take pledges from the poor of the country.62 Yet, 
only a few months later, the Cork Examiner noted how a prominent pawnbroker in Tralee received 
£500 for outstanding loans and had received new pledges, a sign of ‘returning comparative 
prosperity’.63 Other evidence, such as occupations reported in censuses (1841 and 1851), showed 
an increase in pawnbroker numbers between the census years does not support the Marshal’s 
impression of irreversible decline.64  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the history of pawnbroking in famine and pre-famine Ireland. Using 
historical and econometric methodologies, the paper has shown the importance of pawnbroking 
as an aspect of everyday financial life throughout the island, with highest concentrations in Belfast 
and Dublin City. Pawnbrokers provided liquidity to Irish households, smoothed income and 
consumption and provided credit for tradespeople.  They did this daily by making fully 
collateralised loans on clothes, furniture and other household goods, trade-goods, jewellery and 
plate in a very competitive market.  Pawnbrokers’ profits were secured by the value of the goods 
not the ability of those making pledges to repay. Furthermore, they were equal access, open to the 
poor as well as the better off and rich. 
The determinants of pawnbroking in pre-famine and famine Ireland bear resemblance to 
findings for modern day fringe banking. Fringe banking has expanded both in reach and services 
offered in the twenty-first century, as access to formal credit fell because of the financial crisis and 
the Coronavirus pandemic, which forced individuals to pawn assets to survive and thrive.65 As is 
the case today, pawnbrokers in nineteenth-century Ireland met nascent and existing demand, 
including in the industrialising regions where non-agricultural employment was expanding and 
where the ‘modern’ financial system, as represented by JSBs, was weak.  
The much maligned pawnbroking industry provided funds on the value of the pledge and did 
not enquire into their ultimate uses, allowing customers to apply funds for pedestrian but crucial 
 
62 Kerry Evening Post, 27 June 1849. 
63 Cork Examiner, 7 September 1849. 
64 Those identifying as pawnbrokers increased from 321 to 452 between 1841 and 1851. Increases were seen in 
25 out of 32 counties. Data referenced from Crawford et al. (1997). 
65 e.g. Christine Seib, ‘Debt charities cast a wary eye on waters as loan sharks circle,’ The London Times, 25 
March 2008.  Jason Horowitz, ‘Virus Revives Italy’s Age-Old Shadow Safety Net:  The Pawnshop,’ The New 
York Times, 6 July 2020. 
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activities like ensuring there was food on the table for small farmers and labourers when the potato 
harvest was not yet dug or for fishermen when the fish were not running.66 Pawnbrokers also 
enabled the repayment of LFS loans or the payment of rent, something JSBs and LFSs would have 
been unwilling to and TSB could not do.   
The famine was a watershed moment for the pawnbroking industry. As both customers and 
brokers emigrated post famine, the history of the Irish pawnbroking industry  enters transnational 
territory. Woloson (2009, p. 71) highlights how, contrary to popular perceptions of pawnbroking 
being a Jewish dominated industry in the United States, the Irish led the US pawn trade in the post 
famine years. In some cities this meant graduating from second hand dealing into more lucrative 
pawnbroking trade; in others, such as Chicago, Irish dominated pawnbroking quite early only later 
superseded by Jewish brokers. Obvious parallels can be made with other financial experiences of 
emigrants, notably remittances and the emigrant savings banks (e.g., Anbinder et al. 2019).  The 
Irish appear to export their financial habits (pawning and saving), which begs the question: was it 
the financially savvy who were most able to emigrate, and those with good saving and investing 
habits who prospered?  
  
 
66 Woodham Smith (1962)’s classic work on the Irish famine is replete with references to pawnbrokers, 
including fishermen who pawned their gear “to buy a little meal” (Woodham-Smith 1962, p. 291). 
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Figure 1 Monthly Redemption ratios, January 1844 to January 1848  
a)Connaught: Ballina, Balinrobe, Gort, and Loughrea  
 
b)Munster: Rathkeale, Tralee, Thurles, Tipperary 
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c)Leinster: Kells, Mullingar, New Ross 
 
Source; BPP (1849) 
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Figure 2 Monthly Indices of pawnbroker loan amounts (loans) and number of loans 
(Tickets), mean of 1845=1 
 
Note: Loan indices, comprised of 46 pawnbroker returns; ticket indices comprised of 68 pawnbroker returns; 
Mean loan sized derived from 46 pawnbroker returns (amount lent/ tickets). Weights based on share of total 
amount lent for the 46 pawnbrokers; median is annual median mean loan size by all reporting pawnbrokers. 
Vertical line at 1845m11 indicates start of famine period. 
Source: BPP (1849) 
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Figure 3 Monthly Indices of pawnbroker loans, M0 narrow money supply, Currency in 
the hands of the Public, and Bank of Ireland Discount rate (mean  1845=1) 
 
 
 
Sources: BPP (1849) and Kenny & Lennard (2018) 
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Table 1: Pawnbroking returns, 1832-1844 
 
 Pawnbrokers Loan funds Savings banks 
 Aggregate 
returns 
Incomplete 
returns 
Tickets Loans Mean 
loan size 
Loans Pawnbroker 
loans 
relative to 
LFS loans 
Savings Pawnbroker 
loans 
relative to 
TSB 
savings 
 Number Number Million £ m £ £ m 
 
% £m % 
1832 39 18 0.30 0.06 0.18     
1833 131 18 3.27 0.48 0.14     
1834 84 17 2.76 0.39 0.13     
1835 225 4 6.52 0.88 0.14     
1836 250 2 6.31 0.85 0.13     
1837 445 66 9.85 1.19 0.13     
1844 462 - 11.81 1.61 0.14 1.70 94.68 2.75 58.57 
1845 504 - 13.15 1.84 0.14 1.86 98.80 2.92 62.98 
1846 501 - 14.00 1.89 0.13 1.77 106.72 2.86 66.18 
1847 486 - 10.79 1.35 0.12 0.86 156.88 2.41 56.00 
1848 - - - - - 0.72 - 1.33 - 
1849 - - 10.91 1.29 - 0.65 198.67 1.20 107.57 
 
Source: Pawnbroker data: B.P.P. (1837-38); B.P.P. (1849); 1849 aggregate figures reported in Irish Examiner, 29 May 1850;  Loan Fund and TSB data, 
McLaughlin (2014). 
Note: These data are for private pawnbrokers who made returns to the Marshal of Dublin.  
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Table 2 Summary of number of pawnbrokers and pawnbroker loans 
 Barony Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All baronies 
Number of 
pawnbrokers 322 1.44 4.44 0 42 
Loans (£) 322 5007 34,322 0 567,300 
Loans per 100 
capita 322 12.24 38.61 0 329.89 
Mean loan (£) 322 0.05 0.09 0 0.49 
All baronies (excluding Belfast and Dublin) 
Number of 
pawnbrokers 319 1.19 3.11 0 39 
Loans (£) 319 2871 11902 0 176,712 
Loans per 100 
capita 319 11.02 35.17 0 329.89 
Mean loan (£) 319 0.05 0.09 0 0.49 
Munster 
Number of 
pawnbrokers 77 2.58 5.43 0 39 
Loans (£) 77 7,570 22,809 0 176,712 
Loans per 100 
capita 77 22.2 58.9 0 330 
Mean loan (£) 77 0.10 0.12 0 0.49 
Leinster 
Number of 
pawnbrokers 125 0.79 3.89 0 42 
Loans (£) 125 5,773 50,761 0 567,300 
Loans per 100 
capita 125 10.1 32.3 0 244 
Mean loan (£) 125 0.03 0.06 0 0.30 
Ulster 
Number of 
pawnbrokers 72 1.96 5.16 0 41 
Loans (£) 72 3,690 15,513 0 129,238 
Loans per 100 
capita 72 10.3 28.1 0 188 
Mean loan (£) 72 0.06 0.08 0 0.36 
Connaught 
Number of 
pawnbrokers 48 0.50 1.41 0 9 
Loans (£) 48 877 3,208 0 21,610 
Loans per 100 
capita 48 4.8 19.5 0 125 
Mean loan (£) 48 0.03 0.06 0 0.18 
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Table 3 Negative Binomial Regression of the number of  pawnbrokers in 
1844 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Incidence rate ratios Marginal effect at mean 
Loan Fund Societies 1.10* 1.12** 0.204* 0.212** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.109) (0.106) 
Joint Stock Banks 1.83*** 1.83*** 1.280** 1.159** 
 (0.215) (0.211) (0.583) (0.568) 
Savings Banks 1.52** 1.39* 0.888** 0.631* 
 (0.247) (0.241) (0.379) (0.353) 
Non-agricultural 
employment 1.05*** 1.05*** 0.096** 0.094** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.040) (0.041) 
Illiteracy  0.88 0.80 -0.279 -0.418 
 (0.915) (0.851) (2.222) (2.045) 
Poor Law Valuation per acre 0.99 0.97 -0.014 -0.060 
 (0.005) (0.052) (0.011) (0.104) 
City 0.43 0.72 -1.774 -0.630 
 (0.247) (0.312) (1.488) (0.952) 
Leinster 0.77 0.71 -0.557 -0.657 
 (0.380) (0.358) (1.085) (1.028) 
Munster 3.69*** 3.73*** 2.771** 2.530** 
 (1.488) (1.529) (1.144) (1.113) 
Ulster 1.04 0.98 0.087 -0.033 
 (0.548) (0.531) (1.112) (1.040) 
Population density 1.00 0.99 0.002 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.070) (0.027) (0.135) 
Constant 0.07*** 0.07***   
 (0.067) (0.066)   
Log alpha 0.84 0.87   
 (0.178) (0.175)   
Observations 322 319 322 319 
Model chi-square 409.49 180 409.49 180 
df 11 11 11 11 
Loglikelihood -354 -343 -354 -343 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 
Column 1 & 2 robust see form in parentheses, Column 3 & 4 Robust standard errors in parentheses (delta-method 
standard errors), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4 OLS regressions of Pawnbroker loans per capita and mean loan 
sizes 1844. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Loans per 
capita 
Loans per 
capita Mean loans Mean loans 
Loan Fund Societies -0.75 -0.41 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.796) (0.769) (0.003) (0.003) 
Joint Stock Banks 16.67*** 16.41*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (4.871) (4.93) (0.005) (0.005) 
Savings Banks -0.54 -3.64 0.032*** 0.025** 
 (5.779) (5.812) (0.011) (0.011) 
Non-agricultural 
employment 0.28 0.40 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.224) (0.254) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Illiteracy 10.69 11.01 -0.006 -0.007 
 (11.258) (10.819) (0.037) (0.037) 
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre -0.06 -0.03 0.0002 -0.0002* 
 (0.184) (1.572) (0.000) (0.0002) 
City 1.05 29.76 -0.058 -0.015 
 (26.776) (22.033) (0.042) (0.026) 
Munster 12.95** 13.56** 0.062*** 0.063*** 
 (6.108) (6.027) (0.015) (0.015) 
Leinster 5.39 4.52 -0.002 -0.003 
 (4.035) (3.856) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ulster -6.12 -6.71 0.005 0.003 
 (4.401) (4.291) (0.015) (0.015) 
Population density 2.01*** 0.11 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.671) (2.237) (0.001) (0.0002) 
Constant -15.27 -17.491 -0.030 -0.036 
 (11.440) (11.641) (0.034) (0.034) 
Observations 322 319 322 319 
R-squared 0.41 0.30 0.41 0.40 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table  5 Loan Fund Society loans, 1841-1850 
 
 Loan sizes  Implied weekly repayment 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Min Max Mean 
1841 1.89 5.13 3.44 0.09 0.26 0.17 
1842 1.86 4.72 3.47 0.09 0.24 0.17 
1843 2.13 5.17 3.48 0.11 0.26 0.17 
1844 2.43 4.93 3.61 0.12 0.25 0.18 
1845 2.70 5.07 3.74 0.13 0.25 0.19 
1846 2.70 5.26 3.85 0.14 0.26 0.19 
1847 2.37 5.10 3.82 0.12 0.25 0.19 
1848 2.31 6.19 3.90 0.12 0.31 0.20 
1849 2.31 6.46 3.91 0.12 0.32 0.20 
1850 1.66 6.89 3.67 0.08 0.34 0.18 
 
Source: Loan Fund Board annual reports., author calculations 
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Appendix: 
Data summary: 
Figure A1: Pawnbrokers in 1844 by year of registration 
 
Source: BPP (1845b) 
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Figure A2 Annual pawnbroker activity in major cities, 1843-1847 
 
Source: BPP (1849) 
 
Figure A3: Mean loan sizes by county 
 
a) Cavan: 
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b)Down: 
 
 
c) Louth and Armagh 
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d) Tyrone and Fermanagh 
 
 
 
e) Monaghan & Roscommon 
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Table A1: Annual interest schedule of Irish and English pawnbrokers  
 
 Ireland England 
 Interest Ticket Total Interest Ticket Total 
£ APR APR APR APR APR APR 
0.05 50.00 8.33 58.33 50.00 0.00 50.00 
0.1 50.00 4.17 54.17 25.00 0.00 25.00 
0.15 33.33 2.78 36.11 16.67 0.00 16.67 
0.2 37.50 2.08 39.58 18.75 0.00 18.75 
0.25 30.00 1.67 31.67 20.00 0.83 20.83 
0.3 33.33 1.39 34.72 16.67 0.69 17.36 
0.35 28.57 1.19 29.76 17.86 0.60 18.45 
0.4 31.25 1.04 32.29 18.75 0.52 19.27 
0.45 27.78 0.93 28.70 19.44 0.46 19.91 
0.5 30.00 0.83 30.83 20.00 0.83 20.83 
0.55 27.27 1.52 28.79 18.18 0.76 18.94 
0.6 29.17 1.39 30.56 18.75 0.69 19.44 
0.65 26.92 1.28 28.21 19.23 0.64 19.87 
0.7 28.57 1.19 29.76 19.64 0.60 20.24 
0.75 26.67 1.11 27.78 20.00 0.56 20.56 
0.8 28.13 1.04 29.17 18.75 0.52 19.27 
0.85 26.47 0.98 27.45 19.12 0.49 19.61 
0.9 25.00 0.93 25.93 19.44 0.46 19.91 
0.95 26.32 0.88 27.19 19.74 0.44 20.18 
1 25.00 0.83 25.83 20.00 0.83 20.83 
2 25.00 0.83 25.83 20.00 0.42 20.42 
5 25.00 0.33 25.33 15.00 0.33 15.33 
 
 
Sources: Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland , pp 223- 225 & (28 Geo. 3) c. 49 
[I], section 19. 
 
Note: These are maximum legal rates for 12 months as reported in the appendix of the parliamentary enquiry. They 
were the nominal monthly rate multiplied by the number of months in the calendar year. The interest schedule 
increased by ‘one halfpenny per month for each and every sum of two shillings’(((28 Geo. 3) c. 49 [I], section 19). For 
sums greater than £10 pawnbrokers could only charge 6 per cent per annum (B.P.P. 1837-38, p. xv). The 1786 
pawnbroker act permitted charging for duplicates: 1d for loans not exceeding 10 shillings (£0.50), 2d for loans from 
10 shillings (£0.50) not exceeding forty shillings (£2), and 4d for loans exceeding forty shillings (£2) (( 26 Geo. 3) c. 
43 [I], section 5). The interest + ticket was included in the original source. 
The English interest rates increased following the 1872 pawnbroking act and raised rates to Irish levels. 
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Table A2 Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Number of Pawnbrokers Number of registered pawnbrokers BPP (1849) 
Amount lent (£) Total amount of money loans (£’s) BPP (1849) 
Amount lent per 100 capita (£) Amount of loans / population * 100 BPP (1849) 
Number of loans (tickets) Number of loans made (tickets issued) BPP (1849) 
Number of loans per 100 capita Number of loans made / population * 100 BPP (1849) 
Mean loan (£) Amount of loans / number of loans BPP (1849) 
Population density Population / barony area BPP (1843) ; Clarkson et al. (1997) 
LFSRLF 
Loan Fund Societies & Reproductive Loan Funds LFS locations: BPP (1844) 
RLF locations: BPP (1840) 
JSBs Joint Stock Banks Barrow (1973) 
TSBs Trustee Savings Banks Pratt (1846) 
Illiteracy Illiteracy BPP (1843)   
Housing Fourth class housing BPP (1843) 
Poor Law Valuation Poor law valuation per acre BPP (1844b), Tenth Annual report of the Poor Law Commissioners  
Non-agricultural workforce Share of workforce not in agriculture BPP (1843) 
City 
Dummy variable: 1 if barony = a major town or city. Defined as Belfast (Co. Antrim & Co. Down), Carrickfergus, 
Cork City, Drogheda, Dublin City, Galway Town, Kilkenny 
City, Limerick City, Waterford City 
Munster Dummy variable: 1 if Province = Munster Munster = Cork, Clare, Kerry, Limerick, Tipperary, Waterford  
Connaught Dummy variable: 1 if  Province = Connaught  Connaught = Galway, Leitrim, Mayo, Roscommon, Sligo 
Ulster 
Dummy variable: 1 if  Province = Ulster Ulster = Antrim, Armagh, Cavan, Donegal, Down, 
Fermanagh, Londonderry, Monaghan, Tyrone. 
Leinster 
Dummy variable: 1 if  Province = Leinster Leinster = Carlow, Dublin, Kildare, Kilkenny, Kings, 
Longford, Louth, Meath, Queens, Westmeath, Wexford, 
Wicklow  
 
Note: Data georeferenced using methodology from McLaughlin (2009). Barony shapefile from Gregory and Ell (2004) 
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Table A3 Summary statistics  
 Including Belfast and Dublin Excluding Belfast and Dublin 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Pawnbrokers 1.438 4.436 0 42 1.191 3.114 0 39 
Amount lent (£) 5007 34322 0 567300 2862 11884 0 176712 
Amount lent per 100 capita (£) 12.242 38.615 0 329.889 11.002 35.172 0 329.889 
Number of loans (tickets) 36676 229795 0 3746426 22040 81791 0 1196767 
Number of loans per 100 capita 97.406 282.788 0 2079.477 88.559 259.220 0 2079.477 
Mean loan (£) 0.052 0.086 0 0.489 0.051 0.085 0 0.489 
Population density 1.231 5.631 0.099 62.899 0.843 3.339 0.099 34.703 
LFSRLF 1.425 1.751 0 11 1.436 1.756 0 11 
JSBs 0.491 1.015 0 6 0.467 0.967 0 6 
TSBs 0.242 0.503 0 4 0.229 0.457 0 2 
Illiteracy 0.520 0.163 0.118 0.910 0.522 0.161 0.118 0.910 
Housing 0.344 0.152 0.001 0.849 0.347 0.149 0.005 0.849 
Poor Law Valuation 2.267 12.736 0.036 158.417 1.287 4.754 0.036 54.750 
Non-agricultural workforce 31.199 13.970 11.771 85.189 30.721 13.126 11.771 78.993 
City 0.031 0.174 0 1 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Munster 0.239 0.427 0 1 0.241 0.429 0 1 
Connaught 0.149 0.357 0 1 0.150 0.358 0 1 
Ulster 0.224 0.417 0 1 0.219 0.415 0 1 
Leinster 0.388 0.488 0 1 0.389 0.488 0 1 
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Table A4 Correlation matrices  
a) Including Belfast and Dublin 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 1.000               
2 0.665 1.000              
3 0.797 0.877 1.000             
4 0.474 0.484 0.397 1.000            
5 0.128 0.096 0.080 0.352 1.000           
6 0.596 0.550 0.528 0.479 0.252 1.000          
7 0.476 0.288 0.336 0.402 0.169 0.518 1.000         
8 0.438 0.388 0.364 0.239 -0.119 0.413 0.425 1.000        
9 -0.159 -0.144 -0.098 -0.045 0.272 -0.181 -0.225 -0.623 1.000       
10 0.440 0.105 0.292 0.087 -0.060 0.158 0.282 0.452 -0.192 1.000      
11 0.504 0.274 0.376 0.087 -0.023 0.231 0.235 0.572 -0.199 0.668 1.000     
12 -0.116 -0.109 -0.045 -0.238 -0.278 -0.178 0.022 0.086 -0.265 0.005 -0.032 1.000    
13 0.145 0.139 0.145 0.298 0.159 0.030 -0.039 -0.174 0.322 -0.008 0.026 -0.447 1.000   
14 0.063 0.059 -0.027 0.063 -0.062 0.218 0.112 0.306 -0.458 0.041 0.033 -0.428 -0.301 1.000  
15 0.731 0.283 0.467 0.138 -0.014 0.316 0.357 0.522 -0.183 0.698 0.800 -0.017 0.025 0.014 1.000 
 
Corresponding variables: 
 
1. Pawnbrokers ; 2.Pawnbrokers per capita; 3. Pawnbroker loans per capita; 4.Mean pawnbroker loans; 5. LFSRLS; 6.JSBs; 7. TSBs; 8. 
Non-agricultural; 9. Illiteracy; 10. Poor Law valuation; 11.City; 12.Leinster; 13.Munster; 14. Ulster ; 15. Population density 
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b) Excluding Belfast and Dublin 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 1.000               
2 0.748 1.000              
3 0.785 0.904 1.000             
4 0.533 0.486 0.370 1.000            
5 0.226 0.105 0.109 0.365 1.000           
6 0.561 0.518 0.464 0.466 0.278 1.000          
7 0.347 0.275 0.212 0.370 0.209 0.484 1.000         
8 0.343 0.360 0.283 0.217 -0.105 0.364 0.380 1.000        
9 -0.088 -0.119 -0.047 -0.030 0.267 -0.149 -0.203 -0.611 1.000       
10 0.382 0.181 0.230 0.017 0.002 0.109 0.103 0.508 -0.163 1.000      
11 0.328 0.224 0.258 0.038 0.012 0.127 0.113 0.484 -0.128 0.760 1.000     
12 -0.188 -0.108 -0.064 -0.254 -0.279 -0.193 -0.005 0.095 -0.273 -0.013 -0.032 1.000    
13 0.253 0.154 0.180 0.308 0.157 0.046 -0.026 -0.165 0.318 0.094 0.066 -0.450 1.000   
14 0.041 0.038 -0.047 0.068 -0.058 0.214 0.133 0.293 -0.451 -0.053 -0.028 -0.423 -0.299 1.000  
15 0.393 0.203 0.245 0.031 0.043 0.128 0.112 0.472 -0.107 0.956 0.836 -0.054 0.108 -0.056 1.000 
Corresponding variables 
 
1. Pawnbrokers ; 2.Pawnbrokers per capita; 3. Pawnbroker loans per capita; 4.Mean pawnbroker loans; 5. LFSRLS; 6.JSBs; 7. TSBs; 8. 
Non-agricultural; 9. Illiteracy; 10. Poor Law valuation; 11.City; 12.Leinster; 13.Munster; 14. Ulster ; 15. Population density 
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Table A5 Negative Binomial Regression of the number of  pawnbrokers in 1844 
a) Including Belfast and Dublin 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Incidence rate ratios 
Loan Fund Societies 1.21**           
 (0.106)           
Joint Stock Banks  2.73***          
  (0.254)          
Savings Banks   5.18***         
   (1.474)         
Non-agricultural 
employment    1.05***        
    (0.007)        
Illiteracy      0.07***       
     (0.064)       
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre      1.05*      
      (0.029)      
City       13.39***     
       (5.658)     
Leinster        0.43*    
        (0.203)    
Munster         2.40***   
         (0.808)   
Ulster          1.52  
          (0.564)  
Population density           1.08*** 
           (0.015) 
Constant 1.03 0.42*** 0.63** 0.19*** 5.17*** 1.05 1.04 1.85*** 1.08 1.29 1.01 
 (0.280) (0.056) (0.113) (0.057) (2.651) (0.135) (0.127) (0.336) (0.257) (0.266) (0.122) 
Log alpha 4.85*** 1.66*** 3.16*** 3.22*** 4.65*** 4.21*** 3.90*** 4.78*** 4.76*** 5.03*** 3.79*** 
 (0.870) (0.267) (0.596) (0.575) (0.662) (0.600) (0.559) (0.905) (0.873) (0.817) (0.550) 
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 
Model chi-square 4.83 116.13 33.48 62.97 8.48 3.65 37.66 3.19 6.74 1.27 28.95 
49 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Loglikelihood -448 -390 -422 -424 -445 -439 -435 -447 -446 -450 -434 
Pseudo R2 0.0076 0.1351 0.0637 0.0609 0.0135 0.0267 0.0351 0.0097 0.0101 0.002 0.0386 
 
Robust see form in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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b) Excluding Belfast and Dublin 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Incidence rate ratios 
Loan Fund Societies 1.34***           
 (0.100)           
Joint Stock Banks  2.71***          
  (0.295)          
Savings Banks   4.73***         
   (1.249)         
Non-agricultural 
employment    1.05***        
    (0.008)        
Illiteracy      0.22*       
     (0.190)       
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre      1.07***      
      (0.018)      
City       7.70***     
       (4.853)     
Leinster        0.28***    
        (0.077)    
Munster         3.46***   
         (0.956)   
Ulster          1.27  
          (0.334)  
Population density           1.10*** 
           (0.026) 
Constant 0.69** 0.43*** 0.62*** 0.21*** 2.53* 0.99 1.04 1.66*** 0.75** 1.12 1.00 
 (0.113) (0.058) (0.112) (0.069) (1.206) (0.122) (0.127) (0.272) (0.105) (0.211) (0.122) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Log alpha 3.78*** 1.71*** 3.02*** 3.22*** 4.25*** 3.86*** 3.90*** 3.69*** 3.60*** 4.34*** 3.86*** 
 (0.611) (0.276) (0.611) (0.581) (0.665) (0.566) (0.565) (0.590) (0.543) (0.724) (0.564) 
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 
Model chi-square 15.37 83.93 34.59 38.45 3.1 15.76 10.5 21.26 20.1 0.83 15.6 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Loglikelihood -420 -380 -408 -411 -427 -422 -422 -418 -418 -428 -422 
Pseudo R2 0.0203 0.1145 0.0486 0.0409 0.004 0.0161 0.0147 0.0245 0.0259 0.0007 0.016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Table A6 OLS Regressions of Pawnbroker loans per capita 
a) Including Belfast and Dublin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Loan Fund Societies 1.77*           
 (1.004)           
Joint Stock Banks  20.10***          
  (4.089)          
Savings Banks   25.82***         
   (7.758)         
Non-agricultural 
employment    1.00***        
    (0.260)        
Illiteracy      -23.23*       
     (13.021)       
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre      0.89      
      (0.562)      
City       83.57***     
       (29.624)     
Leinster        -3.54    
        (4.168)    
Munster         13.13*   
         (6.942)   
Ulster          -2.54  
          (4.208)  
Population density           3.20*** 
           (0.593) 
Constant 9.72*** 2.38** 5.99*** -19.11** 24.31*** 10.23*** 9.65*** 13.61*** 9.10*** 12.81*** 8.30*** 
 (2.196) (1.015) (2.224) (7.487) (7.553) (2.009) (1.830) (3.004) (1.853) (2.607) (1.859) 
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 
R2 0.01 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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b) Excluding Belfast and Dublin 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Loan Fund Societies 2.17**           
 (0.951)           
Joint Stock Banks  16.88***          
  (3.809)          
Savings Banks   16.33***         
   (4.884)         
Non-agricultural 
employment    0.76***        
    (0.209)        
Illiteracy      -10.24       
     (9.200)       
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre      1.70      
      (1.172)      
City       61.79**     
       (29.825)     
Leinster        -4.60    
        (3.644)    
Munster         14.80**   
         (6.839)   
Ulster          -4.01  
          (3.302)  
Population density           2.58* 
           (1.558) 
Constant 7.88*** 3.12*** 7.26*** -12.29** 16.35*** 8.81*** 9.65*** 12.79*** 7.43*** 11.88*** 8.82*** 
 (1.723) (0.881) (1.959) (6.106) (5.020) (2.061) (1.830) (2.897) (1.417) (2.446) (1.993) 
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 
R2 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7 OLS Regressions of mean loans  
a) Including Belfast and Dublin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Loan Fund Societies 0.02***           
 (0.004)           
Joint Stock Banks  0.04***          
  (0.005)          
Savings Banks   0.07***         
   (0.010)         
Non-agricultural 
employment    0.00***        
    (0.000)        
Illiteracy      -0.02       
     (0.028)       
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre      0.00      
      (0.001)      
City       0.04     
       (0.030)     
Leinster        -0.04***    
        (0.009)    
Munster         0.06***   
         (0.014)   
Ulster          0.01  
          (0.011)  
Population density           0.00** 
           (0.001) 
Constant 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 
R2 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.02 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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b) Excluding Belfast and Dublin 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Loan Fund Societies 0.02***           
 (0.004)           
Joint Stock Banks  0.04***          
  (0.005)          
Savings Banks   0.07***         
   (0.012)         
Non-agricultural 
employment    0.00***        
    (0.000)        
Illiteracy      -0.02       
     (0.027)       
Poor Law Valuation 
per acre      0.00      
      (0.001)      
City       0.02     
       (0.025)     
Leinster        -0.04***    
        (0.008)    
Munster         0.06***   
         (0.014)   
Ulster          0.01  
          (0.011)  
Population density           0.00 
           (0.001) 
Constant 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 
R2 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Spatial regression appendices 
The following provides spatial analysis of pawnbroking activity Spatial Autoregression (SAR) using 
spatial lags of the dependent variable, Spatial lags of the dependent variables (SLX), and spatial 
instrumental variable estimators (SPIV).  
Spatial models take the form: 
Yi = pWYi + βXi + ui 
Yi = pWXi + βXi + ui 
Where W is a spatial weight matrix and Yi is the dependent variable. 𝑊𝑖𝑗  is defined as 
follows, with a distance decay function. 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑣𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
−
∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
−𝑛
𝑗=1
, if 𝑑𝑖𝑗 < 𝑑 , i ≠ j ,  > 0
0,                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
Where d is distance,  𝑣𝑗  a variable of a region j , and the parameter  representing a decay 
function. WY is endogenous (Elhorst 2014) as it reflects the behaviour in neighbouring regions 
(Manski 1993). The analysis from tables 6 and 7 are repeated here with the exception that the count 
variables are linearized by scaling by population. This is a common procedure owing the difficulties 
applying spatial models to count data (Glaser 2017). There is an issue of direct comparability here 
with the spatial results and those from the main text. This arises from the use of negative binomial 
regression models in the main analysis to deal with the issue of overdispersion, while the linear 
transformation of the count data enables use to use OLS this does not address the issue of 
dispersion. Moran’s test for spatial independence indicate that the number of pawnbrokers per 
capita and pawnbroker loans per capita are spatially correlated, but that the mean loan size is not.  
The following report results of OLS, SAR, SXL, and SPIV models. While there is evidence of 
negative spatial spillovers in SAR models, these are not robust to instrumental variable estimation. 
In all specifications the results are consistent with those of the main paper.  
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Table A8 Spatial Regressions of number of pawnbrokers per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Including Belfast & Dublin Excluding Belfast and Dublin 
 OLS SAR SLX SPIV OLS SAR SLX SPIV 
Loan Fund Societies -0.1976 -0.2103 -0.0951 -0.2015 -0.2026 -0.2301 -0.1487 -0.2167 
 (0.313) (0.312) (0.320) (0.307) (0.310) (0.308) (0.318) (0.302) 
Joint Stock Banks 5.4701*** 5.3393*** 5.1738*** 5.4296*** 5.2823*** 5.1136*** 5.2406*** 5.1959*** 
 (1.382) (1.364) (1.444) (1.383) (1.398) (1.372) (1.429) (1.392) 
Savings Banks -0.8109 -0.9370 -0.4244 -0.8500 -0.4680 -0.5494 -0.5094 -0.5097 
 (1.657) (1.674) (1.644) (1.635) (1.749) (1.737) (1.698) (1.708) 
Non-agricultural 
employment 0.2157** 0.2293*** 0.2269** 0.2199** 0.2327** 0.2479*** 0.2257** 0.2405** 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.098) (0.090) (0.094) (0.094) (0.101) (0.095) 
Illiteracy 0.5299 0.6675 4.0565 0.5725 0.2330 0.7451 2.4732 0.4952 
 (4.411) (4.431) (4.311) (4.351) (4.329) (4.345) (3.904) (4.284) 
Poor Law Valuation per 
acre -0.1644*** -0.1307* -0.0972* -0.1540** -0.5139 -0.5242 -0.5705 -0.5192 
 (0.061) (0.071) (0.057) (0.065) (0.493) (0.496) (0.476) (0.485) 
City 6.8444 6.4151 5.7420 6.7114 4.9014 3.8692 3.4256 4.3729 
 (6.055) (6.118) (5.821) (6.002) (5.982) (6.006) (6.049) (5.968) 
Leinster -0.7402 -0.7869 -1.2522 -0.7547 -0.7973 -0.7552 -1.8950 -0.7757 
 (1.730) (1.733) (2.200) (1.703) (1.730) (1.737) (2.191) (1.691) 
Munster 3.4467* 3.9313** 3.3077* 3.5969* 3.5523* 4.2869** 3.0400 3.9284** 
 (1.877) (1.981) (1.944) (1.903) (1.876) (1.996) (1.863) (1.904) 
Ulster -2.5189 -2.2603 -2.1940 -2.4388 -3.0248 -2.6704 -2.8071 -2.8434 
 (1.915) (1.913) (2.337) (1.872) (1.898) (1.895) (2.288) (1.851) 
Population density 0.1192 0.0689 -0.0537 0.1036 0.5249 0.5428 0.6573 0.5340 
 (0.179) (0.202) (0.160) (0.184) (0.819) (0.825) (0.797) (0.806) 
W. Pawnbrokers (Pop)  -0.1174**  -0.0364  -0.1634***  -0.0836 
  (0.056)  (0.091)  (0.056)  (0.087) 
W. Loan Fund Societies   -0.7590    -0.9562  
   (1.017)    (1.150)  
 
   
 
 
 
 
     
58 
 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
W. Joint Stock Banks   -1.0818    -1.5846  
   (1.109)    (1.085)  
W. Savings Banks   -3.3922    0.2880  
   (2.777)    (4.014)  
W. Non-agricultural 
employment   0.0451    0.0184  
   (0.088)    (0.115)  
W. Poor Law Valuation 
per acre   0.0943*    0.1289  
   (0.055)    (0.305)  
Constant -4.0734 -3.9267 -5.5202 -4.0279 -4.2115 -4.1643 -3.5989 -4.1874 
 (4.654) (4.632) (4.879) (4.519) (4.732) (4.712) (5.115) (4.615) 
Observations 322 322 322 322 319 319 319 319 
R-squared 0.3836 0.3876 0.3958 0.3857 0.3445 0.3525 0.3530 0.3506 
 
Notes: The prefix W indicates spatial lag of the corresponding variable with a  parameter of 3. WX are used as instruments for WY in SPIV.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
59 
 
Table A9 Spatial Regressions of number of pawnbroker loans per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Including Belfast & Dublin Excluding Belfast & Dublin 
 OLS SAR SLX SPIV OLS SAR SLX SPIV 
Loan Fund Societies -0.0075 -0.0072 -0.0039 -0.0075 -0.0041 -0.0047 -0.0021 -0.0039 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Joint Stock Banks 0.1667*** 0.1590*** 0.1649*** 0.1672*** 0.1642*** 0.1601*** 0.1643*** 0.1654*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) 
Savings Banks -0.0054 -0.0084 -0.0097 -0.0052 -0.0364 -0.0397 -0.0346 -0.0354 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.057) 
Non-agricultural 
employment 0.0028 0.0038* 0.0026 0.0027 0.0039 0.0044* 0.0035 0.0038 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Illiteracy 0.1069 0.1190 0.2086 0.1061 0.1122 0.1408 0.1738 0.1037 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.139) (0.111) (0.108) (0.109) (0.111) (0.110) 
Poor Law Valuation per 
acre -0.0006 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
City 0.0105 -0.0265 0.0193 0.0130 0.2976 0.2744 0.2593 0.3045 
 (0.268) (0.262) (0.255) (0.265) (0.220) (0.217) (0.221) (0.220) 
Leinster 0.0539 0.0560 0.0151 0.0537 0.0452 0.0525 0.0127 0.0430 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.051) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.037) 
Munster 0.1295** 0.1500** 0.1167** 0.1282** 0.1356** 0.1613** 0.1101** 0.1280** 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.068) (0.051) (0.055) 
Ulster -0.0612 -0.0610 -0.0734 -0.0612 -0.0671 -0.0600 -0.0592 -0.0692 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.042) 
Population density 0.0201*** 0.0182*** 0.0177** 0.0203*** 0.0011 0.0006 0.0054 0.0013 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
W. Pawnbrokers (Pop)  -0.1528***  0.0100  -0.1658**  0.0495 
  (0.058)  (0.098)  (0.067)  (0.139) 
W. Loan Fund Societies   -0.0189    -0.0333  
   (0.037)    (0.044)  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
W. Joint Stock Banks   -0.0586    -0.0359  
   (0.036)    (0.033)  
W. Savings Banks   -0.0066    0.0130  
   (0.085)    (0.112)  
W. Non-agricultural 
employment   0.0040    -0.0001  
   (0.003)    (0.003)  
W. Poor Law Valuation 
per acre   0.0000    0.0093  
   (0.002)    (0.013)  
Constant -0.1527 -0.1682 -0.2519* -0.1516 -0.1749 -0.1882 -0.1354 -0.1710 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.144) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.159) (0.117) 
Observations 322 322 322 322 319 319 319 319 
R-squared 0.4116 0.4190 0.4205 0.4106 0.2999 0.3081 0.3139 0.2942 
 
Notes: The prefix W indicates spatial lag of the corresponding variable with a  parameter of 3.  WX are used as instruments for WY in SPIV. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A10 weekly wages in towns  
 Kilkenny  Dublin*  Dublin^  Belfast  Armagh  Castlecoole  
 Craft General Craft General Craft General Craft General Craft General Craft General 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
c. 1830 - 0.23 
 
 
0.68 
 
 
0.45 1.50 0.63 -  0.90 0.28 0.90 0.25 
c. 1834 - 0.20 
 
 
0.625 
 
 
0.45 1.50 0.63 - 0.35 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.25 
c. 1846 - 0.25 
 
 
0.625 
 
 
0.45 
 1.50 0.63 - 0.30 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.25 
 
Note weekly wage estimated from daily wage series. Dublin * from D’Arcy; Dublin^ from Kennedy & Dowling. 
Source: Kennedy & Dowling (1997).   
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Table A11 weekly wages in  agriculture 
 1833-40 1845 
 £ £ 
Connaught 0.18 0.20 
Munster 0.20 0.20 
Leinster 0.23 0.24 
Ulster 0.27 0.26 
Ireland 0.23 0.23 
Source: Bowley (1899) 
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